








From a Genetic Predisposition to an Interactive Predisposition:
Rethinking the Ethical Implications of Screening for Gene-Environment Interactions
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In a widely acclaimed study from 2002, researchers found a case of gene-environment interaction for a gene controlling neuroenzymatic activity (low vs. high), exposure to childhood maltreatment, and antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). Cases of gene-environment interaction are generally characterized as evincing a genetic predisposition; for example, individuals with low neuroenzymatic activity are generally characterized as having a genetic predisposition to ASPD. I first argue that the concept of a genetic predisposition fundamentally misconstrues these cases of gene-environment interaction. This misconstrual will be diagnosed, and then a new concept—interactive predisposition—will be introduced. I then show how this conceptual shift reconfigures old questions and raises new questions for genetic screening. Attempts to screen embryos or fetuses for the gene associated with low neuroenzymatic activity with an eye towards selecting against the low-activity variant fall prey to the myth of pre-environmental prediction; attempts to screen newborns for the gene associated with low neuroenzymatic activity with an eye towards early intervention will have to face the interventionist’s dilemma.





The concept of gene-environment interaction (or G×E) refers to cases in which different genetic groups (i.e., two or more populations differentiated based upon a genetic difference) phenotypically respond differently to the same array of environments. In a widely acclaimed study from 2002, Avshalom Caspi, Terrie Moffitt, and their colleagues found a case of G×E for a gene controlling neuroenzymatic activity (low vs. high MAOA activity), exposure to childhood maltreatment (none vs. probable vs. severe), and the development of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) (Caspi et al. 2002). ASPD is the clinical term for sociopathy, defined by a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others (American Psychiatric Association 2000). MAOA is a metabolic enzyme that inactivates neurotransmitters. In the Caspi-Moffitt study, childhood maltreatment consisted in physical and sexual abuse; however, other experiences also counted as childhood maltreatment, such as harsh discipline, neglect, and poor mother-child interactions. As illustrated in Figure 1, Caspi and Moffit found that individuals with high-MAOA activity gradually increased their risk of developing ASPD as incidents of childhood maltreatment increased, whereas individuals with low-MAOA activity drastically increased their risk of developing ASPD as incidents of childhood maltreatment increased.​[3]​ 

Figure 1. Reaction norm graph for MAOA activity, childhood maltreatment, and ASPD. (From Caspi et al. 2002, Figure 1. Reprinted with permission from AAAS.).

The Caspi-Moffitt results were instantly recognized as a landmark achievement in the history of human genetics. Behavioral geneticist Dean Hamer, in a review article for Science just two months after Caspi and Moffitt published their results, identified the Caspi-Moffitt study as one of three examples paving the way for the future of behavioral genetics (Hamer 2002).​[4]​ The Economist hailed the results that same week: “The first study has just been published showing how a particular gene and a particular environment interact to produce violent individuals” (Economist 2002, 71). Bioethicist Erik Parens wrote, “It might not be an exaggeration to say that, if replicated, the Caspi-Moffitt MAOA study will turn out to have been a watershed event in the history of behavioral genetics” (Parens 2004, S22). And legal scholar Robert Stone forecasted, “Although the predictive power of genetics has been discussed many times before, the Caspi Study may prove to be the beginning of a new era” (Stone 2003, 1559).​[5]​ 
It was the significance of Caspi and Moffit’s empirical results that received the wide attention. But what was just as significant, though less scrutinized, was the way in which those results were conceptualized. Individuals with low-MAOA activity were characterized as having a genetic predisposition to ASPD or violence. In his consideration of the familial cycle of abuse, Stone wrote, “The Caspi Study demonstrates that, in addition to free will, the difference between those who break the cycle of abuse and those who do not turns on the victim’s genetic predisposition” (Stone 2003, 1562). David Wasserman titled an article on the bioethical implications of the Caspi-Moffitt study, “Is There Value in Identifying Individual Genetic Predispositions to Violence?” (Wasserman 2004). Crucially, and as will be explored in detail below, this concept of a genetic predisposition has framed the ethical and legal reflections on this case of G×E. Jonathan Moreno, for instance, pointed to the Caspi-Moffitt study and warned, “Prospective parents might therefore test embryos for the MAOA marker before implantation to avoid giving birth to a child with this particular potential for criminality” (Moreno 2003, 151). And, considering the possible implications of the Caspi-Moffitt study on the criminal justice system, Paul Appelbaum asked, “Should genetic propensities mitigate punishment for criminal behavior?” (Appelbaum 2005, 26)
The thesis of this article will be that this concept of a genetic predisposition fundamentally misconstrues cases of G×E such as that found in the Caspi-Moffitt study. In turn, the ethical questions raised regarding a “genetic predisposition to violence” have been equally misconceived. In the next section, I focus on exposing how the concept of a genetic predisposition fundamentally misconstrues these cases of G×E. With that diagnosis made, I then offer a remedy for the conceptual incoherence by introducing a new concept for these cases of G×E—interactive predisposition. The conceptual shift from a genetic predisposition to an interactive predisposition paves the way for exploring how this shift reframes questions concerning the incorporation of research on G×E into ethical discussions of screening embryos, fetuses, and newborns for an interactive predisposition to ASPD.     

II. THE CONCEPT OF A GENETIC PREDISPOSITION:
ITS APPLICATION AND MISAPPLICATION
Cases of G×E are generally characterized in terms of a genetic predisposition to the trait under investigation; for example, individuals with low-MAOA activity from the Caspi-Moffitt study are characterized as having a genetic predisposition to violence. The goal of this section is to convey how this concept fundamentally misconstrues cases of G×E. Understanding this misconstrual begins by recognizing the fact that cases of G×E come in two forms: those resulting in a change in scale, and those resulting in a change in rank (Lynch and Walsh 1997). The traditional concept of a genetic predisposition, I will argue, is appropriately applied only to cases of a change in scale; the misconstrual arises when it is also applied to cases of a change in rank. 

The Appropriate Application of “Genetic Predisposition”  
An instance of G×E resulting only in a change of scale refers to cases in which different genetic groups respond differently to the same array of environments, but that difference in phenotypic response does not alter the fact that the higher-ranking group maintains that higher ranking across all tested environments (Lynch and Walsh 1997). An example will help to display this phenomenon, so consider the reaction norm graph in Figure 2. This is a hypothetical, modified version of the original graph from the Caspi-Moffitt study. Everything in Figure 2 is identical to the original graph except that the high-MAOA group has been lowered by 0.25 on the antisocial behavior index (y-axis) for each environment. Now the low-MAOA group maintains its higher ranking on the antisocial behavior index in each of the tested environments. This is still a case of G×E because the two groups do still respond to the array of environments quite differently, but all that has changed is the scale of the difference between the two groups in the different environments. 


Figure 2. Hypothetical reaction norm graph for MAOA activity, childhood maltreatment, and ASPD.

	To begin evaluating the appropriateness of the concept of genetic predisposition as applied to cases of G×E, a definition of this concept must first be afforded. “Genetic predisposition” may be defined as follows:
Genetic Predisposition: The presence of a genetic difference between various groups consistently increases the probability of individuals from one group, in comparison to individuals from the other group(s), developing a particular phenotypic trait regardless of the tested environmental conditions.

Note the relational nature of this definition. Members of any group may be susceptible to developing the particular phenotypic trait under investigation if exposed to the environmental stressor. But attaching “genetic” to “predisposition” is only appropriate if it is the genetic difference that consistently increases the probability of individuals from one group developing the phenotypic trait relative to individuals from the other group(s). Also note the fact that the relative predisposition is only justifiably applicable within the tested environmental conditions. Under unknown or untested environmental conditions, the relationship between the groups might change quite drastically (Hogben 1933; Lewontin 1974). Thus, one cannot assume just because individuals in a particular group are relatively genetically predisposed to a particular phenotypic trait under known environmental conditions that this relationship will hold true under any environmental conditions.
	Cases of G×E resulting in a change of scale may be appropriately characterized with the concept of a genetic predisposition as defined above. Consider the hypothetical case graphed in Figure 2: in every tested environment (none, probable, and severe childhood maltreatment), individuals in the low-MAOA group maintained their relatively elevated risk for ASPD; moreover, the slope of the low-MAOA group was much steeper than that of the high-MAOA group as the instances of childhood maltreatment increased. What “genetic predisposition” implied in this case, then, was that the presence of the genetic difference between the two groups consistently put individuals from the low-MAOA group at an increased risk of developing ASPD relative to the individuals from the high-MAOA group. And again, notice that the account here was necessarily relational. As the instances of childhood maltreatment increased, both groups significantly increased on the antisocial behavior index. In statistical terminology, the environmental variable was a statistically significant main effect. Thus, individuals from both genetic groups were susceptible to developing ASPD in the presence of childhood maltreatment. But there still remained a consistent difference in risk between the genetic groups in each tested environment, and this difference itself increased drastically as the instances of childhood maltreatment increased. There was a change between the groups across the different environments, but it was only a change in scale. Or, for an empirical example, consider the BRCA1 and BRCA2 alleles responsible for increased risk of breast and ovarian cancers. A “genetic predisposition to breast/ovarian cancer” is appropriately linked with these alleles, since bearing these alleles consistently increases the risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer in known environments. 

The Misapplication of “Genetic Predisposition”
But notice that the above account is decidedly not what occurs in the actual Caspi-Moffitt study. Caspi and Moffitt’s MAOA study is instead an instance of G×E resulting in a change of rank. An instance of G×E resulting in a change of rank refers to cases where different genetic groups respond differently to the same array of environments, and that difference in phenotypic response is so extreme that the higher-ranking group in one environment becomes the lower-ranking group in a different environment (Lynch and Walsh 1997). This is precisely what we find in the actual reaction norms for the Caspi-Moffitt study’s low- and high-MAOA groups graphed above in Figure 1. In the environments with probable and severe childhood maltreatment, the low-MAOA group did in fact score higher on the antisocial behavior index than the high-MAOA group. However, in the environment with no childhood maltreatment the low-MAOA group actually scored lower than the high-MAOA group on the index. Importantly, this case of G×E did not display the consistency in the relationship between the two groups across all of the tested environments, which was described in the hypothetical case of a change in scale described above.
	The original Caspi-Moffitt study has now been replicated several times. In 2004, a group of behavioral geneticists at the University of Virginia investigated the phenomenon in a new population from the United States (Foley et al. 2004). Their replication was slightly altered. They still differentiated genetic groups based on low- vs. high-MAOA activity; however, they instead tracked childhood conduct disorder, the childhood equivalent of ASPD. Nevertheless, their results were consistent with the change in rank. More recently, Caspi and Moffitt themselves participated in a replication study with a new population from Britain (Kim-Cohen et al. 2006). And again, their results were consistent with the change in rank. There have also been two failures to replicate the interaction effect (Haberstick et al. 2005; Young et al. 2006); however, the study by Kim-Cohen et al. (2006) also included a meta-analysis of the data from the multiple sources, and the interaction effect was significant.
	Interestingly, while the reaction norms in Figures 1 do clearly cross each other (or change in rank), the difference between the two genetic groups in environments with no childhood maltreatment is not statistically significant. (The reaction norms graphed in Foley et al. (2004) also change rank but also are not statistically significant in their difference between genetic groups in environments without childhood adversity.) In other words, the gap between the genetic groups in environments without childhood maltreatment/adversity could conceivably be the result of chance. If the gap really is due to chance and there is no actual difference between these two genetic groups, then my analysis is inapplicable to the case of MAOA, childhood maltreatment, and the development of ASPD, since the case would be reduced to one of a change in scale. To be clear, it would not mean that my analysis of the inappropriateness of the concept of a genetic predisposition to cases of G×E resulting in a change of rank is mistaken, but it would mean that the MAOA case does not fall within this category. However, there is good reason to attribute the lack of significance to a different explanation—insufficient sample size. It is notoriously difficult to detect interaction effects without very large sample sizes (Wahlsten 1990). Starting with the Caspi-Moffitt study and continuing with the multiple replications, the results of these studies repeatedly display the change in rank for the genetic groups across the array of environments. However, these studies generally include only several hundred participants with only a proportion in each environment, providing relatively little statistical power to tease apart a genetic difference in the separate environments. Foley et al., in the discussion of their results, reach a similar conclusion: “An interaction without a significant main effect of genotype results in a crossing-over or reordering of risk among groups contingent on environmental exposure [i.e., a change in rank]. In this case, risk associated with a specific genotype differs qualitatively in association with different environments. Variation in exposure to environmental risks reorders genotypic effects. Our data are consistent with [this] explanation, but a larger study is required to definitively address this possibility” (Foley et al. 2004, 742). Thus, it seems prudent to assume that the change in rank is a very real possibility. Such prudence is warranted both because there is a long history of cases of G×E resulting in a change of rank in plant and non-human animal studies (Hogben 1933; Lewontin 1974; for a history, see Tabery 2007, 2008), and also because a growing number of human studies are finding cases of G×E resulting in a change of rank for complex traits such as asthma (Hoffjan et al. 2005) and depression (Caspi et al. 2003; Eley et al. 2004). In the meantime, then, I will proceed as if the change in rank is real for the MAOA case and continue to diagnose the fundamental misconstrual that arises from characterizing it with the concept of a genetic predisposition. 
	The concept of genetic predisposition, as defined above, captures cases where a genetic difference between groups consistently increases the probability of individuals from one of these groups developing a phenotypic trait regardless of the tested environmental conditions. But in the Caspi-Moffitt study the environmental conditions were crucial for assessing the relationship between the low-MAOA and the high-MAOA groups with regard to risk of developing ASPD. High-MAOA activity was relatively protective in certain environments, while it was relatively aggravating in other environments. So prior to an individual actually experiencing (or otherwise being able to predict) exposure to childhood maltreatment there is simply no way to assess whether an individual with low-MAOA activity will be more or less prone to developing ASPD than an individual with high-MAOA activity. The low-MAOA individual is less likely to develop ASPD in environments with no childhood maltreatment, while s/he is more likely to develop ASPD in environments with probable and severe childhood maltreatment. Employing the concept of a genetic predisposition to ASPD when the environmental conditions are unknown, we are forced incoherently to say that individuals in the low-MAOA group are simultaneously more prone to developing ASPD and, at the same time, less prone to developing ASPD.​[6]​ In short, the concept of a genetic predisposition fundamentally misconstrues these cases of G×E resulting in a change of rank because it leads to this incoherent result (Tabery Forthcoming). 

III. THE CONCEPT OF AN INTERACTIVE PREDISPOSITION
Several bioethicists have rightly stressed the need to promote conceptual clarity concerning G×E research and behavioral genetic research more generally in light of the looming social, ethical and legal implications of this research. Parens warned, “…the consequences of new information about genetic influences on the sorts of people we are will to a large extent be determined by the interpretations we arrive at in the course of our public conversation” (Parens 2004, S27). He thus called for “conceptual tools—basic concepts and distinctions” that will guide this public conversation (ibid, S30). Likewise, Richard Sharp wrote, “Clarifying these emerging areas of concern is an important step in minimizing the potential harms of deciphering complex gene-environment interactions” (Sharp 2001, 146). Suggestions such as these should be heeded, for there is already an indication that G×E results can be quickly morphed into interpretations of ‘genes for’ complex behavioral traits, reverting to a naïve genetic essentialism (Dreyfuss and Nelkin 1992). Parens has pointed to alarming distillations of the Caspi-Moffitt study in the popular press. “That behavioral geneticists are studying such interactions is good news,” Parens reminded his readers; however, “the bad news is that the MAOA study was the subject of a piece in Popular Mechanics titled ‘Criminal Genes.’ The piece in Time about the MAOA study was entitled, ‘The Search for the Murder Gene’ (Parens 2004, S8). 
	Should we really be surprised that the Caspi-Moffitt study has been morphed into a story about “Criminal Genes” when the concept of a genetic predisposition to violence has been used to characterize the results? With the concept of a genetic predisposition to violence, the rigidly deterministic nature of the genetic element may have been abandoned, but it is still the “genetic” that is in the driver’s seat. That is, it is still the “genetic” that is doing the predisposing. Or, more accurately, it is still the genetic difference that is associated with the difference in relative predisposition. It may be inappropriate to title articles in the popular press about the Caspi-Moffitt study “Criminal Genes” or “The Search for the Murder Gene,” but what about “Criminal Susceptibility Genes” or “The Search for the Murder-Propensity Gene”? Would these alternatives be acceptable? If one were entitled to employ the concept of a genetic predisposition to violence, then I do not see how one could criticize such distillations. But when we realize that the Caspi-Moffitt study was a case of G×E resulting in a change of rank, then we clearly see that even the non-deterministic alternative titles are misleading. Which variant of the gene associated with MAOA activity is the criminal susceptibility gene—low or high? Which variant of the gene associated with MAOA activity is the murder-liability gene—low or high? The lesson of the last section was that these questions are unanswerable unless the environmental conditions are specified.
	I am in agreement with Parens’s and Sharp’s diagnoses. Conceptual clarity is exactly what is needed to properly discuss instances of G×E and convey the ethical and legal implications of this phenomenon. In this spirit, I suggest jettisoning the concept of a genetic predisposition from the discussions of G×E that result in a change of rank. As Parens suggested, “conceptual tools” are needed here. A new concept is needed to capture the different, unique relationship between gene, environment, and phenotype found in these cases and to set this relationship (and the implications of this relationship to be discussed below) apart from cases of genetic predisposition or genetic determinism. I propose employing the concept of an interactive predisposition for such cases. “Interactive predisposition” may be defined as:
Interactive Predisposition: The presence of a genetic difference between various groups both increases and decreases the probability of individuals from one group, in comparison to individuals from the other group(s), developing a particular phenotypic trait depending on the environmental conditions experienced. 

A genetic predisposition is relational in one sense, whereas an interactive predisposition is relational in two senses. Like the concept of a genetic predisposition, the concept of an interactive predisposition is relational in the sense that the probability of individuals from one group developing the phenotypic trait under investigation is always considered in comparison to individuals from the other group(s) developing the phenotypic trait. For a genetic predisposition, however, that relation between the groups maintains a consistency (between which is higher and which is lower ranking) across all tested environments, whereas this is not the case for an interactive predisposition. For an interactive predisposition, the relation between the groups is itself relative to the environmental conditions experienced (Tabery Forthcoming). 

IV. SCREENING FOR MAOA STATUS:
FROM A GENETIC PREDISPOSITION TO AN INTERACTIVE PREDISPOSITION
ASPD, which affects roughly 3% of males and 1% of females (Fishbein 2000), takes a significant toll on those who suffer from the disorder and on those who are forced for whatever reason to interact with those who suffer from the disorder. In disregarding and violating the rights of others, those with ASPD regularly engage in actions that are deemed inappropriate and potentially illegal by the society in which they live; such actions, in turn, lead to broken relationships, and possibly to incarceration or a more extreme punishment. So it is not surprising that efforts are made to prevent the development of ASPD (Fishbein 2000; McCord and Tremblay 1992; Reid and Eddy 1997). These preventative strategies generally consist in the prediction of those individuals deemed at risk of developing ASPD and the intervention on those factors deemed pertinent to this development. For better or worse, the prediction of those who are at risk of developing ASPD is thoroughly probabilistic. Quantitative behavioral genetic studies reveal a heritable element for the disorder (Carey and Goldman 1997; Goldman and Fishbein 2000; McGuffin and Thapur 1998), but there are no single genes that deterministically ensure the development of ASPD (Carey 1996; Ridenour 2000). Candidate genes have been identified, but most individuals with these genes still do not develop ASPD (Goldman 1996). There are also no natural environments that deterministically ensure the development of ASPD. Certain environmental variables, like childhood maltreatment or coercive parenting, do account for a significant portion of variation for ASPD in a population, but still most children who are maltreated or coerced do not develop ASPD (Reid, Patterson, and Snyder 2002). 
	What made the Caspi-Moffitt study so exciting, then, was the fact that they found a particular genetic variable and a particular environmental variable which, when joined, led to almost all individuals developing ASPD. More specifically, Caspi and Moffitt found that 85% of the individuals in their sample who both had low-MAOA activity and experienced severe childhood maltreatment subsequently engaged in antisocial behavior. And to relate this finding to the question of societal impact, Caspi and Moffitt found that, while only 12% of the sample fell into this low/severe sub-group, they accounted for a full 44% of the violent convictions of the entire study population.
In light of the striking results from the Caspi-Moffitt study, how might their findings be incorporated into the ethical discussions of genetic screening for a complex behavioral trait? Commentators on the Caspi-Moffitt study have pointed to two potential venues for such a genetic test: (a) parents interested in screening either embryos or fetuses with an eye toward implantation or termination, and (b) states interested in a policy of mandatory newborn screening with an eye toward prediction and intervention. 
	The purpose of this section is to address the questions that have been raised by commentators regarding these venues by drawing on the lesson of the previous sections and then exploring the ethical questions that are raised by screening for interactive predispositions rather than genetic predispositions. The moral will be that screening for interactive predispositions raises a series of ethical questions that are distinct from those raised by screening for genetic predispositions. Attempts to appropriate the results from the Caspi-Moffitt study for preimplantation or fetal diagnosis will suffer from what I call the myth of pre-environmental prediction in the next section. Attempts to appropriate the results from the Caspi-Moffitt study in order to implement a policy of mandatory newborn screening will have to face what I discuss as the interventionist’s dilemma. 

Preimplantation Diagnosis, Fetal Screening, and the Myth of Pre-Environmental Prediction
The preimplantation genetic diagnosis of embryos and the genetic screening of fetuses both raise interesting ethical questions. Is the utilization of genetic information to determine who should and should not be born a reversion to the negative eugenic practices of the early-20th century (Paul 1994)? The utilization of genetic information in order to select against potential humans with undesirable traits certainly smacks of eugenic motivations (Duster 1990). But now it is the parents of embryos and fetuses doing the selecting, not the state, so if the threat of eugenics is real, it is certainly of a different sort (Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, and Wikler 2000; Kitcher 1996). The purpose of this section will not be to carve out a position on this broad social debate. Rather, the purpose will be to assess how the results of the Caspi-Moffitt study are being and should be incorporated into this broad social debate. That is, the question to be addressed is the following: What precisely are the implications of the Caspi-Moffitt study for the ethical discussions of preimplantation genetic diagnosis and fetal screening?
	Jonathan Moreno, in his discussion of the Caspi-Moffitt study, warns, “if [MAOA] or other neurotransmitters are roughly associated with socially offensive behaviour, even under less extreme environmental insults, they could be brought into the controversy over preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Prospective parents might therefore test embryos for the MAOA marker before implantation to avoid giving birth to a child with this particular potential for criminality” (Moreno 2003, 151). And David Wasserman, asking “Is There Value in Identifying Individual Genetic Predispositions to Violence?”, introduces his article with a similar question. Since Caspi and Moffitt found that the 12% of their research participants who were both maltreated and carrying the gene for low-MAOA activity accounted for 44% of all convictions for violent crimes, Wasserman wonders, “what if we could identify some individuals in that 12% not only at birth, but in utero, or before implantation?” (Wasserman 2004, 24). Wasserman warns against using such information to selectively implant, abort, or intervene on those with a “violence propensity”; for instance, he argues that a society may want to have these low-MAOA, violence-prone individuals around: “maybe Kitty Genovese, who was murdered on a New York City street while more than thirty witnesses did nothing would have been more likely to survive her attack if there were more low MAOA men on her block” (ibid, 29).
	It is important to note that Moreno and Wasserman do not advocate utilizing the results of the Caspi-Moffitt study for the purposes of preimplantation genetic diagnosis or fetal screening. Rather, they are simply drawing attention to the ethical questions raised by the possibility that these results could be utilized for screening purposes because it may seem reasonable to select against low-MAOA individuals with a genetic predisposition (or “propensity” for Moreno and Wasserman) to violence. My claim is that, by framing these ethical questions in terms of the concept of a genetic predisposition to violence, they have both fallen trap to the myth of pre-environmental prediction and thereby misconceived the ethical questions raised by the Caspi-Moffitt study.
	For example, should parents want to screen their embryos or their fetuses for the gene controlling MAOA activity in order to identify and select against those embryos or fetuses with low-MAOA activity, as Moreno warns? Only if the parents are already intending to maltreat their children! That is, if the children are not likely to experience childhood maltreatment, then it is in fact the low-MAOA embryos or fetuses that are less likely than the high-MAOA embryos or fetuses to develop into adults with ASPD. Would Kitty Genovese, as Wasserman wonders, have been better off if there were more low-MAOA men living on her block? Only if we assume that those men experienced childhood maltreatment. That is, if the men on her block had not experienced childhood maltreatment, then it would have been the high-MAOA men who were more likely to develop ASPD. Slipping into the myth of pre-environmental prediction arises when one forgets that Caspi and Moffitt found an instance of an interactive predisposition and assumes that the genetic information alone is enough to label the low-MAOA individuals “genetically predisposed to ASPD or violence.” 
	Importantly, once we keep the myth of pre-environmental prediction in sight and avoid slipping into its trappings, it does not follow that the ethical questions raised by genetic screening disappear. Instead, a new series of questions arise. For example, if parents can reasonably predict that their children will not experience childhood maltreatment, then it would be the high-MAOA embryos or fetuses that will be selected against if the parents wanted to protect against ASPD. This is because, in the environments with no childhood maltreatment, Caspi and Moffitt found the high-MAOA sub-group to have the elevated risk of developing ASPD. Consider parents who visit their genetic counselor and decide that they want to select against the high-MAOA genetic variant. Should this request be predicated on proof of no history of engaging in childhood maltreatment? How would a genetic counselor secure this information? Or what about parents who do have a history of maltreating children but who have now turned over a new leaf? Should they now be allowed to select against the high-MAOA genetic variant as well, or is the risk of childhood maltreatment and then the subsequent risk of developing ASPD just too high for the low-MAOA child-to-be? 
This question of confirming or disconfirming childhood maltreatment is complicated when we remember that, in the Caspi-Moffitt study, childhood maltreatment included physical and sexual abuse, as well as neglect, harsh punishment (e.g. parents “smack him or hit him with something”), and poor mother-child interactions (e.g. rough handling of the child, consistent negative affect toward the child, indifference to the child’s performance). With the severe forms of childhood maltreatment, social service departments have the authority to intervene in the family and remove children from this abusive environment. But this is not the case with these less severe forms of maltreatment. Consider a parent who smacks or ignores their child in public. The parent may be socially sanctioned, but it is unlikely that any legal action would be taken against the family. Or, less judgmentally, consider an impoverished, single parent who must work more than one job and spend hours away from home. In this case, inadequately engaged parenting might be predictable even though it is entirely unintentional—a consequence of the parent’s socioeconomic status. What of the parents who fully admit to a genetic counselor that they often smack their current children with something and intend to continue this practice with their subsequent children? Or what of the parents who admit to a genetic counselor that their socioeconomic situation unintentionally leads to the inadequately engaged parenting of their current children and will likely lead to the inadequately engaged parenting of their subsequent children?
Notice that these particular ethical questions regarding screening for an interactive predisposition are not raised by screening for a genetic predisposition.​[7]​ If there were a true genetic predisposition for ASPD or violence regardless of childhood maltreatment status, then a set of prospective parents whose child is likely to experience maltreatment and a set of prospective parents whose child is unlikely to experience maltreatment should both reach the same conclusion. If these two sets of parents both go to a genetic counselor in order to avoid, insofar as it is possible, having a child with behavioral problems, then a genetic counselor should make the same recommendation to both sets of parents: select against the low-MAOA embryo or fetus in order to lower the risk of having a child who develops ASPD. But with the interactive predisposition, the environmental conditions expected to be experienced during development must be figured into the decision. 
Caught by the trappings of the myth of pre-environmental prediction and assuming that the Caspi-Moffitt study displays a genetic predisposition to ASPD or violence, these different ethical questions are overlooked. It is only when we realize that the researchers found an instance of an interactive predisposition that we can appreciate the unique problems raised by their results. This is crucial information for the genetic counselor and the prospective parents who have visited their genetic counselor in order to reduce the chance of their child having ASPD. If parents can predict the presence or absence of childhood maltreatment, then this must be figured into the decision between selecting against the low- or the high-MAOA embryo or fetus. If the parents do not intend to maltreat the child and do not foresee that maltreatment will be a problem, then the genetic counselor would suggest selecting against the high-MAOA embryo or fetus. If the parents do intend to maltreat the child in spite of efforts to convince them otherwise, or if conditions are such that their child is likely to experience maltreatment in some form, then the genetic counselor would suggest selecting against the low-MAOA embryo or fetus.

Newborn Screening and the Interventionist’s Dilemma
The mandatory screening of newborns for genetic disorders raises interesting ethical questions (Newborn Screening Taskforce 2000; Pass et al. 2000). What is the purpose of such tests? For whose benefit are the tests undertaken? What requirements in terms of predictive accuracy and treatment options must be met before a test is required? As of 2007, there are a handful of genetic tests mandated in the United States, with a great deal of variation between states (Green, Dolan, and Murray 2006; Therrell 2001). There are, however, increasing efforts to expand this pool (Hampton 2004; Howell 2006), along with pleas for caution (Botkin et al. 2006; Kerruish and Robertson 2005). As with the previous sub-section on screening embryos and fetuses, the purpose of this sub-section will not be to carve out a position on this broad debate. Rather, the purpose will be to assess how the results of the Caspi-Moffitt study are being and should be incorporated into this broad debate. 
The possibility of a mandatory screening program based on the results of the Caspi-Moffitt study has not escaped the notice of commentators. Ravinesh Kumar, for instance, suggests that “although likely to be highly controversial, we may decide to identify ‘at-risk’ individuals prone to developing antisocial tendencies by screening for the MAOA functional polymorphism and recognizing those who harbour the ‘low-activity’ variant” (Kumar 2003, 183). Paul Appelbaum, discussing the Caspi-Moffitt study, warns that “the pressure to screen is likely to increase if intervention can be shown to actually reduce crime. If effective treatment becomes available, the pressure to identify [at-risk] individuals through screening at birth may be irresistible” (quoted in Moran 2006). And Wasserman notes, “It would be tempting for the state to set a low threshold for pharmacological prevention for large categories of potentially vulnerable young men. For example ‘prescribing’ MAOA supplements for all young men screened as low MAOA, regardless of social class or family circumstances, would avoid blatant class bias, as well as intrusive and expensive inquiries into maltreatment [that] fell short of abuse and neglect” (Wasserman 2004, 28).  
	Again, Kumar, Applebaum, and Wasserman are not endorsing the implementation of a mandatory screening program based on the Caspi-Moffitt results. They are simply trying to draw attention to the ethical issues that would arise if a program were implemented to identify and intervene on the “at-risk” individuals deemed “genetically predisposed to violence.” But the lesson for preimplantation and fetal screening is also applicable here: There is no way to determine who the individuals “at risk” for ASPD are before the environmental conditions are experienced (or at least reliably predicted). The genotype alone does not establish the relative risk of developing ASPD. 
	Again, as with preimplantation and fetal screening, recognizing the switch from a genetic predisposition to an interactive predisposition does not eliminate the ethical questions; instead, it raises a new dilemma unique to interactive predispositions—what I will call the interventionist’s dilemma. Genes and the environment both contribute to the development of ASPD (Farrington 1997; Rutter 1997). Cases of G×E reveal an interdependent causal relationship between the genetic variable and the environmental variable during the process of individual development (Tabery 2007). For ASPD, this developmental story starts early, manifesting itself first as childhood conduct disorder and transitioning to ASPD once the individual turns 18. This developmental story is affirmed by the Caspi-Moffitt study. During childhood, an individual learns the process of moral deliberation from those who care for him or her. This process of learning occurs at multiple levels: social, organismal, brain-system, cellular, and molecular. In emotionally charged situations, neurotransmitters are released throughout the brain and controlled by the limbic system. MAOA, a neuroenzyme, is then responsible for breaking down those neurotransmitters once the threat has passed. If caregivers maltreat the child through either neglect or abuse, these charged situations can become commonplace; and, without a sufficient supply of MAOA, heightened emotional response can persist for some time, ultimately having an impact on how the child learns to deal with conflict and resolution. Not surprisingly then, a premium is placed on early intervention in discussions of ASPD treatment—focusing on children and adolescents (McCord and Tremblay 1992). The rationale is that, once the environmental stressors are experienced and the disorder has developed, there is little hope of effective treatment in adults, who generally do not respond well to standard psychotherapy and suffer a high rate of recidivism for crime (Hemphill, Templeman, Wong, and Hare 1998). So the promise of a pharmacological intervention that could be implemented early in this developmental process is naturally appealing. The thought is that increasing MAOA activity for the low-MAOA individuals (call it an “MAOA boost”), thereby making them high-MAOA individuals, could act to buffer them against the environmental stressors that cause ASPD. After the environmental stressors have already been experienced, then the damage may be irrevocably done, thereby rendering the MAOA boost ineffective. If, however, the MAOA boost comes early—say, starting at birth—then the individuals may have the neurochemical resources to withstand the stress even at its earliest onset.    
	But notice that the warrant for this early intervention program requires ignoring the presence or absence of childhood maltreatment and treating all low-MAOA individuals at birth as if they are the at-risk population. For those low-MAOA individuals who experience childhood maltreatment, the potential advantage of early intervention is clear. In the Caspi-Moffitt study, individuals with low-MAOA activity were much more likely to develop ASPD in the presence of moderate and severe childhood maltreatment than were high-MAOA individuals. The implication seems to be that an early intervention program that provided a pharmacological MAOA boost to those individuals might have prevented many of them from going on to engage in antisocial behavior. But if the early intervention program starts at birth and ignores the presence or absence of childhood maltreatment, then this means that the individuals in the environment without childhood maltreatment will also receive the pharmacological MAOA boost. Recalling Figure 1, note what will happen to the rate of ASPD for that population: It will increase. That is, the pharmacological intervention boosting all low-MAOA individuals to high-MAOA individuals will decrease the risk of developing ASPD for those individuals who experienced maltreatment while simultaneously increasing the risk of developing ASPD for those individuals who do not experience maltreatment.
	The two horns between which the interventionist is caught should now be clear. On the one hand, the fact that ASPD is a developmental disorder with early onset militates for an early intervention program in order to provide a treatment before the environmental stressors take their toll. On the other hand, embracing this early intervention strategy necessitates treating all low-MAOA individuals from birth before knowledge of childhood maltreatment is known, thereby decreasing the risk of some while increasing the risk of others. The way past the second horn is to wait and see who does and does not experience childhood maltreatment, and to intervene pharmacologically only once the presence of the environmental stressor can be confirmed. However, waiting pushes the interventionist back on the first horn of the dilemma: Wait until childhood maltreatment can be confirmed, and the damage may already be done.       
Now, one response to the interventionist’s dilemma might be a kind of utilitarian comparison of sub-groups. The thought here would be to first note how many MAOA/maltreatment sub-groups there are in the Caspi-Moffitt study—6: low/none, low/probable, low/severe, high/none, high/probable, and high/severe. Then, turning to Figure 1, a comparison is made at each environment (none, probable, and severe) of whether the switch from low- to high-MAOA activity leads to an increase or a decrease in risk of ASPD. If it leads to a decrease, then that is a point in favor of the early intervention program; if it leads to an increase, then that is a point against the early intervention program. On this calculus, the interventionist pushes through the dilemma and decides to intervene. In two of the environments (probable and severe), the switch from low- to high-MAOA activity leads to a decrease in risk. In only one of the environments (none), the switch from low- to high-MAOA activity leads to an increase in risk. Two beats one. But this solution belies important information about the constitution of these sub-groups. The switch from low- to high-MAOA activity does decrease the risk of developing ASPD in two of the environments measured. But only 1/3 of the population from the Caspi-Moffitt study fell into these two environments, whereas 2/3 of the population from the Caspi-Moffitt study fell into the environment without childhood maltreatment. This should not be surprising; most parents do not maltreat their children. Ultimately, then, implementing the early intervention program would lead to a decrease in risk for 1/3 of the population and an increase in risk (albeit slight) for 2/3 of the population.

V. CONCLUSION
	This article explored the conceptualization of cases of G×E, as well as the way in which research on such cases is incorporated into ethical discussions of genetic screening. Cases of G×E, such as that found in the Caspi-Moffitt study on MAOA, childhood maltreatment, and ASPD, are generally characterized as representing a genetic predisposition to the trait under investigation. In turn, bioethical commentators have asked: Should parents test their embryos or fetuses for this genetic predisposition to ASPD in order to screen against the gene associated with low-MAOA activity? And should the state test all newborns for this genetic predisposition to ASPD in order to identify and treat individuals with the gene associated with low-MAOA activity from birth? 
	I first argued that the concept of a genetic predisposition, while appropriate for cases of G×E resulting in a change of scale, fundamentally misconstrued cases of G×E that result in a change of rank (such as was found in the Caspi-Moffitt study). For cases of G×E resulting in a change of rank, individuals were incoherently understood to be simultaneously more and less genetically predisposed to the trait under investigation. With this diagnosis made, I then offered a remedy for this conceptual incoherence—a new concept for cases of G×E resulting in a change of rank: interactive predisposition.  
	I then explicated how this conceptual shift from a genetic predisposition to an interactive predisposition reconfigured old questions and raised new questions in the confines of the ethical discussions about screening for genes implicated in cases of G×E. With regard to preimplantation diagnosis or fetal screening, the thought that screening against low-MAOA individuals will lead to a decreased risk in developing ASPD suffered from the myth of pre-environmental prediction. There was simply no way to assess whether low- or high-MAOA individuals were more or less at risk of developing ASPD until the environmental conditions of development were either experienced or reliably predicted. With regard to newborn screening, the thought that identifying and pharmacologically treating low-MAOA individuals from birth, as part of an early intervention program aimed towards preventing the development of ASPD, was forced to face the interventionist’s dilemma. A successful treatment program required an early intervention, perhaps even beginning at birth; however, an MAOA boost to low-MAOA individuals from birth would both decrease the risk of developing ASPD for some individuals while simultaneously increasing the risk of developing ASPD for many more individuals. As more cases of G×E resulting in a change of rank are identified for complex human traits, there will likely be an increased pressure to develop genetic tests that screen for the genes associated with these cases. Keeping the distinction between a genetic predisposition and an interactive predisposition in focus will be crucial, both in terms of properly conceptualizing such cases and in terms of incorporating such cases into the ethical discussions of screening for these complex traits.   
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^3	  As I will discuss below, attention must also be paid to the children who do not experience childhood maltreatment. 
^4	  The other two studies that Hamer identified as significant involved a neuroimaging study of differences in amygdale activity correlated with a genetic difference (Hariri et al. 2002), and an examination of different patterns of gene expression for different alleles in a single person (Yan et al. 2002).  
^5	  The enthusiasm for the Caspi-Moffitt study can be attributed to two factors. First, debates over the existence of G×E have existed at the heart of the nature-nurture debate for the last century (Tabery 2007, 2008, Forthcoming); the Caspi-Moffitt results showed definitive evidence of G×E for a complex trait in a human population. And second, Caspi and Moffitt’s focus on ASPD placed their study in the controversial history of research on the relation between genes and criminal violence (for a recent example, see Brunner et al. 1993, as well as commentaries on this study by Andrews 2002; Brunner 1996; Coombs 1999; Denno 1996; and Mann 1994). In contrast to examining just the relation between a gene and ASPD, however, Caspi and Moffitt investigated the relation between gene, environment, and ASPD, pointing the direction to a more complex appreciation for the interactive relation between these variables.
^6	  This bizarre conclusion was on full display in the pages Science in a disagreement over how to interpret the recent sequencing of J. Craig Venter’s genome. Jon Cohen (2007), discussing Venter’s sequenced genome, first pointed out that the sequencing revealed a genetic predisposition to a variety of diseases and disorders including ASPD. Jon Beckwith and Corey Morris (2007), however, replied by pointing out that Venter has the long form of the MAOA gene, not the short form. “If these findings are correct,” they concluded, “then Venter is at lower risk, not increased risk, for ‘antisocial behavior’” (Beckwith and Morris 2007, 1550). But neither Cohen nor Beckwith and Morris mentioned Venter’s exposure (or lack thereof) to childhood maltreatment. And, without that information, it is simply impossible to judge his relative predisposition; that is, without that information, Venter is simultaneously more and less prone to developing ASPD.
^7	  Of course, this does not imply that testing for genetic predispositions is at all easy. Judy Garber (1999), for instance, warns of the complex variety of considerations that must be made in testing for hereditary breast/ovarian cancer. My concern here is just to display how these variety of considerations become even more complex when a prediction must also be made about the environment. 
